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A. Background 
1 In Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd and Others v 
Marshall-Burnett and Another (Jamaica) Privy Council (3 February 2005) (UK) 
(hereinafter ‘Jamaica Constitutional Case’), the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (JCPC) held that the entrenched provisions of the Constitution of Jamaica 
can be amended by the Parliament providing that the procedures in Section 49 of 
the Constitution are met (see Jamaica Constitution Order in Council: 23 July 1962 
(Amended to 2011)). The decision reinforces the sovereignty of the Jamaican 
Constitution over that of the Jamaican Parliament. The decision voids the three bills 
that the Jamaican Parliament passed that would have abolished appeals to the JCPC 
and replaced it with the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). According to the 
JCPC, the CCJ did not guarantee the same protection that are entrenched in the 
Jamaican constitution. The CCJ was established in 2001 by Caribbean heads of 
states and came into operation in 2005 as a regional appellate tribunal for the Page: 
1 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM). 
B. Facts of the Case 
2 In 2004 the Jamaican Parliament passed a trio of legislations implementing the CCJ 
(The Caribbean Court of Justice (Constitutional Amendment) Act 2004, Act 20 of 
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2004; The Caribbean Court of Justice Act 2004, Act 21 of 2004; and, The Judicature 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Act 2004, Act 19 of 2004). The bills were to 
(1) abolish the JCPC as the final appellate court and replace the JCPC with the CCJ, 
(2) to implement in Jamaican law the international agreement establishing the CCJ, 
and (3), substituting the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) right of appeal to the 
JCPC in criminal matters with the right of appeal to the CCJ. The parliamentary 
procedures used to adopt the bills faced legal action at the Jamaican Supreme Court 
while the bills were still going through Parliament. The Supreme Court dismissed 
the challenge as premature. However, the Jamaican Court of Appeal heard the case 
on the merits but rejected the challenge. On 30 September 2004, the Governor 
General gave ascent to the bills, but the appellants appealed to the JCPC, and as a 
result, there was an undertaking that the bills would not enter into force until after 
the proceedings at the Privy Council. 
C. Procedural Issues: Entrenched versus Deeply Entrenched 
3 At the outset, the Privy Council cautioned that it was a question of whether the 
procedural means set out in the Constitution had been met when the three bills were 
passed. Specifically, at issue were the entrenched and deeply entrenched provisions 
of the Constitution and the appropriate methods to amend those provisions (→ 
Page: 2 
entrenched clauses). Section 110 of the Constitution provides for a right of appeal 
to the Privy Council, and the first bill, the CCJ Constitutional Amendment Act 
2004, altered Section 110. Section 49 in general set out the entrenched and deeply 
entrenched provisions of the Constitution. Section 49(3) and (4) sets out how deeply 
entrenched provisions can be amended, including through a referendum after the 
amending legislations have been approved by two-thirds of members of each house 
(Jamaica Constitutional Case, para. 10). To amend the entrenched provisions of 
the constitution, as set out in Section 49(2) requires the same procedures for the 
deeply entrenched provisions, except that there would be no need for a referendum. 
The other provisions of the Constitution are also subject to amendment by a 
majority vote by members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, but there 
are also safeguards in Section 54(1) from amending those provisions.  
4 The Jamaican Supreme Court which has been in operation since 1880 is entrenched 
in the Constitution, and so is the Court of Appeal, in operation since 1962. However, 
appeal to the Privy Council, as set out in Section 110, is not entrenched, and only 
requires a majority vote in Parliament, if need be, to repeal. If that had been the 
case, then the entrenched Court of Appeal could constitute the ‘supreme judicial 
authority’ given that its ‘constitutional position is buttressed by safeguards’ 
(Jamaica Constitutional Case, para. 16) designed to guarantee independence. The 
appellants argued that the creation of the CCJ would not enjoy the entrenched 
provisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, they 
submitted that the  
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parliamentary procedure followed was not that mandated by the Constitution for 
amendment of an entrenched provision … [I]t would make a mockery of the 
Constitution if the safeguards entrenched to ensure the integrity of legal process 
in Jamaica could be circumvented by creating a superior court enjoying no such 
constitutional protection (Jamaica Constitutional Case, para. 16).  
5 For the appellants, what mattered was the ‘the substance of the law’ and ‘not the 
form’ (ibid.), and therefore, the three bills ‘impliedly alter entrenched provisions of 
the constitution’ and did not follow the constitutional procedures for altering 
entrenched provisions. 
D. The Decision 
6 The Privy Council held that the Jamaican Constitution was sovereign, and the three 
bills were invalid under the Constitution. The Privy Council began its analysis by 
agreeing with Kariapper v Wijesinha, Privy Council [1968] AC 717, 743 (UK), that 
the words ‘amend or repeal’ also by implication meant ‘alter’ (Jamaica 
Constitutional Case, para. 19) and then turned to the question of whether the proper 
constitutional procedures were followed or if the CCJ Agreement was different. If 
different, the Privy Council reasoned, then ‘the effect of the legislation is to alter, 
within the all-embracing definition in Section 49(9)(b) … [and] an important 
function of a constitution is to give protection against governmental misbehaviour, 
and the three Acts give rise to a risk which did not exist in the same way before’ 
(Jamaica Constitutional Case, para. 21). According to the Privy Council, the test 
to determine whether the three bills followed the correct constitutional procedures 
was a matter of substance:  
[T]he test is not whether the protection provided by the CCJ Agreement is 
stronger or weaker than that which existed before but whether, in substance, it is 
different, for if it is different the effect of the legislation is to alter, within the all-
embracing definition in Section 49(9)(b) …. The Board is driven to conclude 
that the three Acts, taken together, do have the effect of undermining the 
protection given to the people of Jamaica by entrenched provisions of Chapter 
VII of the Constitution (Jamaica Constitutional Case, para. 21).  
7 It should at once be pointed out that the Privy Council stated that the Jamaican 
people could abolish appeal to Her Majesty in Council as ‘they are fully entitled to 
take appropriate steps to bring its role to an end’ (para. 4) providing that the 
appropriate constitutional procedures for amendments are followed. The ruling can 
be characterized as a victory for ‘constitutional sovereignty’ when measured against 
the Westminster model of → parliamentary sovereignty. In that sense, what the 
ruling did was to put a dent into the limits of the law-making powers of the Jamaican 
Parliament as a democratically elected body. Moreover, the ruling was just one in 
a long line of judgments that displayed the rocky relationship that sovereign 
countries have with the Privy Council who still enjoy a right of appeal (see also → 
constitutional adjudication of the Privy Council). 
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E. Parliamentary Sovereignty versus Constitutional Sovereignty: 
an Assessment 
8 There are three ways to examine the constitutional adjudication of this case. The 
first is to examine it in light of similar decisions that the Privy Council made in the 
last century pertaining to current and former jurisdictions of the Court such as 
Ireland or Canada. Hence, when compared with Robert Lyon Moore and Ors v the 
Attorney General of the Irish Free State, Privy Council [1935] AC 484 (UK) when 
the Privy Council had to consider whether the Irish Parliament had the authority to 
amend the article of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland 
(Anglo–Irish Treaty (1921))—the rulings are strikingly different. In Moore v 
Attorney General, the Privy Council agreed that legislations passed were not in 
contravention of the Anglo–Irish Treaty (which is not an act of the Irish Parliament). 
The Jamaican Constitution, being an Order in Council—and not act of the Jamaican 
Parliament––does provide for Parliament to amend it, which they duly exercised in 
the passing of the three bills. However, in this context, it was not a matter of power 
or authority when compared to Moore v Attorney General; it is whether the 
provisions set out in Section 49 of the Jamaican Constitution are met. This leads me 
to the second way in which this case can be assessed: the issue of ‘form of the law’ 
versus that of the ‘substance of the law’. The Privy Council citing Hinds v the 
Queen, Privy Council [1977] AC 195 (UK) reasoned that ‘it is the substance of the 
law that must be regarded, not the form’ (Jamaica Constitutional Case, para. 16). 
Nevertheless, Hinds was different—it was about legislative power for specific 
crimes—in that it extended the jurisdiction of the Jamaican courts, and therefore, 
the Privy Council in Jamaica Constitutional Case paid attention to substance, in a 
way, that undermines the development of constitutional authority within Jamaica. 
In this regard, to uphold the perception, as set in Hinds and reinforced in Jamaica 
Constitutional Case, that substance is a higher form of law—over that of the form 
of law, represents incredulity on how far developments in Caribbean constitutional 
law are when the final arbiter is not an indigenous judicial institution.  
9 The third and final issue that can be raised is parliamentary sovereignty versus 
constitutional sovereignty. Although Jamaica adopted the Westminster model of 
parliament, there is one noticeable departure. The UK enjoys parliamentary 
sovereignty where parliament is the supreme lawmaker, and Jamaica enjoys 
constitutional sovereignty. This is a point the ruling acknowledges:  
[I]t is also true that when the people of Jamaica adopted their constitution as an 
independent nation in 1962 they made certain very significant departures from 
the constitutional practices of the United Kingdom … Thus, the Constitution and 
not, as in the United Kingdom, Parliament is … to be sovereign’ (para. 9).  
Section 2 of the Jamaican Constitution provides that ‘if any other law is inconsistent 
with this constitution, this constitution shall prevail, and the other law shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void.’ But the Parliament failed to recognize the 
Constitution as sovereign in that the Constitution of Jamaica requires a two-thirds 
majority in a referendum to amend its entrenched provisions and no such 
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referendum was held. In addition, in most instances, the two political parties have 
been wary of putting to popular vote any constitutional matters. Moreover, the 
government when it passed the three bills did not allow the six-month requirement 
for the bills to be tabled before Parliament. 
F. Follow-Up to the Decision 
10 At present, Jamaica, like much of the English-speaking Caribbean Commonwealth 
nations, has two constitutional courts: The Privy Council and the CCJ. The CCJ is 
unique in that it is a two-tier system with original and appellate jurisdiction. In 
original jurisdiction, the CCJ can decide on matters relating to the integration block 
in the region—the Caribbean Community (this equals to an international tribunal 
for the Caribbean)—whilst its appellate jurisdiction (for all civil and criminal 
matters) has only four states signed up so far: Barbados, Belize, Dominica and 
Guyana. In 2015, the Jamaican Government reintroduced the three bills in 
Parliament (The Constitution (Amendment) (Caribbean Court of Justice) Act 2015; 
The Judicature (Appellate Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Act, 2015 and The Caribbean 
Court of Justice Act, 2015). However, the then government changed in a 2016 
general election. Presently there are no initiatives to move forward with replacing 
the Privy Council in Jamaica. The Justice Minister, Senator Mark Golding, who 
then reintroduced the three bills in 2015, addressed various reasons for the bills’ 
reintroduction. However, in his parliamentary speech of 16 October 2015 he only 
touched upon one issue from the ruling––the question of referendum that was raised 
in the Privy Council decision of 2005, and he explained that ‘a referendum would 
be a huge mistake.’ Thus, in legal (and political) terms, the constitutional threshold 
set out in Jamaica Constitutional Case would be the subject of political decision 
and not the people of Jamaica. 
 
11. The decision, like many other decisions from the Privy Council relating to Caribbean 
jurisprudence has been met with apprehension in some quarters in the Caribbean. On a 
broader level, there has been the concern that the independence of the CCJ could not be 
guaranteed as the same level of protection provided by the Jamaican constitution under the 
entrenched provisions. However, the appointments of judges to the CCJ is the task of an 
independent body – the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission (RJLSC) to 
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